Similar Search Results - EconBiz

United but (un-)equal: Human capital, probability of divorce and the marriage contract

Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre; Roeder, Kerstin - 2012

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting where complete specialization (one of the spouses uses up all the education resources) is optimal with no divorce risk. Symmetry in education (both spouses receive an equal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291461

Bequests, filial attention and fertility

Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre - 1987

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000747353

United but (un)equal : human capital, probability of divorce and the marriage contract

Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre; Roeder, Kerstin - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009762566

United but (un)equal : human capital, probability of divorce, and the marriage contract

Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre; Roeder, Kerstin - In: Journal of population economics 28 (2015) 1, pp. 195-217

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010470399

United but (un-)equal : human capital, probability of divorce and the marriage contract

Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre; Roeder, Kerstin - 2012

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting where complete specialization (one of the spouses uses up all the education resources) is optimal with no divorce risk. Symmetry in education (both spouses receive an equal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009674949

United but (un)equal : human capital, probability of divorce and the marriage contract

Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre; Roeder, Kerstin - 2012

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting where complete specialization (one of the spouses uses up all the education resources) is optimal with no divorce risk. Symmetry in education (both spouses receive an equal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009683129

Bequests, filial attention and fertility

Cremer, Helmuth - In: Economica 59 (1992) 234, pp. 359-375

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001126127

Education for attention : a Nash-bargaining solution to the bequest-as-exchange model

Cremer, Helmuth - In: Public finance 48 (1993), pp. 85-97

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001340736

United But (Un-)Equal : Human Capital, Probability of Divorce and the Marriage Contract

Cremer, Helmuth - 2012

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting where complete specialization (one of the spouses uses up all the education resources) is optimal with no divorce risk. Symmetry in education (both spouses receive an equal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013096466

United But (Un)Equal : Human Capital, Probability of Divorce and the Marriage Contract

Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre; Roeder, Kerstin - 2021

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting where complete specialization (one of the spouses uses up all the education resources) is optimal with no divorce risk. Symmetry in education (both spouses receive an equal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315829

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