Using a sample of 22,442 firm-year observations for 3,721 U.S. listed firms, we show that family firms, on average, issue annual reports with higher readability than do nonfamily firms. Higher readability could occur due to lower obfuscation or less information conveyance. By controlling for...

Stock price crash risk could be lower in family firms because the controlling family investorshave a longer-term interest, hold greater decision rights and are better informed thaninvestors in diffusely owned firms (alignment effect). However, the agency costs betweenfamily and nonfamily...

The extant literature on family-controlled firms in the U.S. presents a mixed picture on how family control affects opacity and value creation. In this study, we show that the mixed results arise from the differences among family firms with regard to the presence of founders and the extent of...

We show using a sample of U.S. listed firms that larger and older family firms and those that plan to access the capital market differentiate themselves from other family firms by choosing independent and effective corporate boards and by taking demonstrably independent board actions that are...

In this study, we document that independent corporate boards of Hong Kong firms provide effective monitoring of earnings management, which suggests that despite differences in institutional environments, corporate board independence is important to ensure high quality financial reporting. The...