According to the prior literature, family executives of family-controlled firms receive lower compensation than non-family executives. One of the key driving forces behind this is the existence of family members who are not involved in management, but own significant fraction of shares and...

This paper studies the impact of the concentration of control, the type of controlling shareholder and the dividend tax preference of the controlling shareholder on dividend policy for a panel of 220 German firms over 1984-2005. While the concentration of control does not have an effect on the...

This study provides empirical evidence on the relationship between dividend payout ratios, executive compensation and agency costs in Italy. Corporate governance in Italy is distinguished by the fact that a large number of Italian firms are family-controlled, which may theoretically reduce...

We examine the roles of dividends and leverage to mitigate agency problems within family firms in Indonesia. Using simultaneous equations, we find a significant negative association between family ownership and dividend payout and a two-way negative relation between dividend payout and leverage....

We examine the association between ownership structure and dividend payout policy in a family firms dominated economy. More specifically, we test whether family firms pay higher dividend compared to counter non-family firms in Bangladesh. We argue that family firms are more likely to pay higher...

The article analyses inter-dependencies between dividend, capital structure, and cost of capital, factoring the ownership structure of listed firms in India, using 3SLS system approach. The study finds that family firms are dominant with concentrated ownership. Dividend, leverage, and average...

By using detailed ownership data from Sweden, we investigate the factors associated with corporate investment decisions in family firms compared to non-family firms. We find that the family owner's portfolio diversification level is to some extent, and the use of dual-class share mechanism by...

We apply control rights theory to explain the structure and determinants of financial covenants in private equity backed leveraged buyouts. We analyze 130 German transactions from 2000 to 2008, covering about 40 percent of the LBO market during this period. We consider Germany to be a superior...

This study examines how family firm characteristics affect capital structure decisions. In our analysis we disentangle the influence of three distinct components of a family firm: ownership, supervisory and management board activities by the founding family. Thereby, we use a unique panel...