This study investigates the relationship between family ownership, agency costs, financial performance, and companies' business strategies. The targeted population of this study were all 143 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2007-2014. About 31% (45) of...

Employing data on publicly listed Indian manufacturing firms covering the period 1996-2012, we investigate the impact of the presence of banker-director on the board of family firms. We posit several hypotheses that highlight the pros and cons of the presence of banker-directors. The findings...

We employ agency theory to argue that the effects of family (and founder) ownership vs. management will be quite different: the former is expected to contribute positively to performance, the latter is argued to erode performance. Previous studies, due to problems of multicollinearity have been...

Using nationally representative Norwegian data we show family-owned workplaces are less likely to close than observationally similar non-family-owned workplaces. But this changed during the Crisis when the family businesses' closure hazard soared. This hike in 2009 was not related to performance...

We examine how the legal protection of outside shareholders and the appropriative costs that they induce influence the incentives for private firms to go public. A higher degree of protection of shareholders can increase the appropriative costs associated with the conflict between managers and...

This paper investigates the impact of family control and institutional investors on CEO pay packages in Continental Europe, using a large data set of 915 listed firms with 4,045 firm-year observations from 14 countries over the period 2001-2008. We find that family control curbs the level of CEO...

This paper investigates the impact of family control and institutional investors on CEO pay packages in Continental Europe, using a dataset of 754 listed firms with 3,731 firm-year observations from 14 countries during 2001-2008. We find that family control curbs the level of CEO total and cash...