We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary …

In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of … of each potential marriage decides whether to marry or to remain single at the beginning of the first period. Individuals … whether to stay married or to unilaterally divorce. We show that, for any society, there exist matching environments where the …

An important paper by Chiappori et al. (2012) has proposed an elegant and parsimonious model of spousal matching over …

An important paper by Chiappori et al. (2012) has proposed an elegant and parsimonious model of spousal matching over …

We investigate how job displacement affects whom men marry and study implications for marriage market matching theory … substitutes rather than complements in the marriage market; (ii) our findings are hard to reconcile with one-dimensional matching … if matched with low-earning women and to re-match with higher earning women. We use a general search and matching model …

We investigate how job displacement affects whom men marry and study implications for marriage market matching theory … substitutes rather than complements in the marriage market; (ii) our findings are hard to reconcile with one-dimensional matching … if matched with low-earning women and to re-match with higher earning women. We use a general search and matching model …

In this paper we study marriage formation through a two-sided secretary problem approach. We consider individuals with … characteristics. We show that individuals with higher universal characteristic tend to be more picky in their marriage hunting. This …

stable. In particular, stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We show …We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption … patterns. We start by defining a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is …

. Stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We characterize stable marriage …We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption …. We define a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is stable …