Recently, Batabyal (2005) has analyzed a game model of dowry determination in which a mediator plays a key role. Batabyal's analysis shows that the equilibrium dowry offers from the bride and the groom optimally trade off the desire to make an assertive offer with the likelihood that this offer...

Researchers have paid scant attention to matchmaking from the perspective of a matchmaker. Therefore, our purpose is to analyze the circumstances under which a matchmaker optimally accepts or rejects individual matching assignments. We concentrate on two specific cases. In the first (second)...

Recently, Batabyal (1998) has analyzed the nature of the decision making process in arranged marriages. Specifically, he has shown that a marrying agent's optimal policy depends only on the properties of the current marriage proposal, independent of whether there is recall of earlier marriage...

In this paper I use the theory of Markov Decision Processes to understand aspects of arranged marriages. I construct a stylized model of arranged marriages and, inter alia, I show that a decision maker's optimal marrying rule depends only on the nature of the current marriage proposal,...

Even though arranged marriages have been around for quite some time, economists have paid little attention to the nature of decision making in such marriages. Therefore, we know very little about the efficacy of traditional methods of decision making in arranged marriages. Given this state of...