We examine the effect of auditor conservatism on corporate innovation. We hypothesize that because conservative auditors constrain income-increasing accounting discretion, managers may sacrifice long-term investments in innovation to boost current earnings and meet short-term performance...

We propose that audit quality is likely to increase in the earlier years due to a Learning Effect and in later years it decreases due to a Bonding Effect. Adopting a quadratic model, we find that the average turning point is between 12 to 16 years for a large sample of U.S. firms. With an...

This study shows that auditors are more likely to charge higher audit fees, issue false-positive going concern opinions (i.e., Type I error), and resign from high asset redeployability (AR) firms. In supplemental tests, we use path analysis to show that the significant associations between AR...

This paper examines how accounting audits impact investment decisions in the presence of agency conflicts. Investors choose between a short-term risk-free asset and a long-term risky project. The manager in charge of the latter has incentives to inflate interim payoffs to be able to continue a...

We examine the effect of auditor conservatism on corporate innovation. We hypothesize that, because conservative auditors constrain income-increasing accounting discretion, managers may sacrifice long-term investments in innovation to boost current earnings and meet short-term performance...

This paper examines the impact of accounting conservatism and auditing conservatism on earnings quality. Four proxies were used to measure earnings quality; persistence, accrual quality, value relevance and smoothness. We use the published annual reports of all the listed firms in the Muscat...

This paper analyzes the impact of agents' risk aversion and other agency parameters on optimal bias in the performance measures used for incentive contracts. Prior research has shown that the limited liability of the agent results in a demand for accounting systems that are stringent compared to...

In the model there are two types of financial auditors with identical technology, one of which is endowed with a prior reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a “two-tier equilibrium” in which “reputable” auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for...

We hypothesize that companies in the same product market avoid sharing the same audit partner when they are concerned about possible information spillovers. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that product market rivals are less likely to share the same partner when they perceive that...

We argue that the market for audit services closely resembles a common value procurement (seller's) auction, where auditors generate a private estimate of the actual cost of an audit engagement prior to quoting the client a price. Thus, we conduct a systematic examination of audit pricing and...