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On September 3-4, 2009, SUERF and Utrecht University School of Economics jointly organized the 28th SUERF Colloquium on "The Quest for Stability" in Utrecht, the Netherlands. The papers contained in this SUERF Study jointly published with DNB and Rabobank are based on contributions to this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011706504
On September 3-4, 2009, SUERF and Utrecht University School of Economics jointly organized the 28th SUERF Colloquium on "The Quest for Stability" in Utrecht, the Netherlands. The papers contained in this SUERF Study jointly published with DNB and Rabobank are based on contributions to this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011706507
On September 3-4, 2009, SUERF and Utrecht University School of Economics jointly organized the 28th SUERF Colloquium on "The Quest for Stability" in Utrecht, the Netherlands. The papers contained in this SUERF Study jointly published with DNB and Rabobank are based on contributions to this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011706512
This paper analyses the reforms in the architecture of EMU since the eruption of the euro crisis in 2010. We describe major weaknesses in the original set-up of EMU, such as lack of fiscal discipline, diverging financial cycles and competitiveness positions, and a lack of crisis instruments....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010945595
We analyse the relationship between tail risk and crisis measures by governments and the central bank. Using an adjusted Merton model in a game theoretical set-up, the analysis shows that the participation constraint for interventions by the central bank and the governments is less binding if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010583805
This paper models a financial sector in which there is a feedback between individual bank risk and aggregate funding market problems. Greater individual risk taking worsens adverse selection problems on the market. But adverse selection premia on that market push up bank risk taking, leading to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009193243