Many economists and policy-makers believe that bailouts of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), though unavoidable ex post, are inefficient ex ante: The expectation of such bailouts is said to lead to moral hazard in the form of excessive risk taking. We argue that this view...

Recently, Blanchard and Kremer (BK) argued that disorganization has led to the output decline in the former Soviet Union. In this paper we introduce liquidity and credit constraints into the BK model and show how these problems can alleviate the hold-up problem. We argue further that barter...

This paper analyzes the private production of safe assets and its implications for financial stability. Financial intermediaries (FIs) originate loans, exert hidden effort to improve loan quality, and create safe assets by issuing debt backed by the safe payments from (i) their own loans and...

The present study undertakes an overview of the role of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) within the banking crisis management framework. It is structured in four Section:Section 1 discusses the policy objectives of DGSs, namely the protection of depositors and the contribution to the stability...