We use a classic Merton credit risk framework to argue that Islamic Banking Institutions (IBIs) face less incentive to take on risks than Conventional Banking Institutions (CBI). IBIs have less incentive for risk shifting both in and outside of distress situations. We test and confirm this...

We analyse the poisonous interaction between bank rescues, financial fragility and sovereign debt discounts. In our model balance sheet constrained financial intermediaries finance both capital expenditure of intermediate goods producers and government deficits. The financial intermediaries face...

We investigate the effectiveness of "Keynesian" fiscal stimuli when government deficits and debt rollovers are (possibly partially) financed by balance sheet constrained financial intermediaries. Because financial intermediaries operate under a leverage constraint, deficit financing of fiscal...

CoCo's (contingent convertible capital) are designed to convert from debt to equity when banks need it most. Using a Diamond-Dybvig model cast in a global games framework, we show that while the CoCo conversion of the issuing bank may bring the bank back into compliance with capital...

We propose a credit portfolio approach for evaluating systemic risk and attributing it across institutions. We construct a model that can be estimated from high-frequency CDS data. This captures risks from privately held institutions and cooperative banks, extending approaches that rely on...