The paper analyzes the interaction between an endogenous capital structure and investment decision, and the incentive scheme of bank executives. We show that the implementation of capital requirements, which are contingent on compensation schemes, drive a wedge between the interests of the...

This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate...

We present a simple model to study the risk sensitivity of capital regulation. A banker funds investment with uninsured deposits and costly capital, where capital resolves a moral hazard problem in the banker's choice of risk. Investors are uninformed about investment quality, but a regulator...

This paper analyses whether the introduction of capital requirements for bank government bond holdings increases financial stability by making the banking sector more resilient to sovereign debt crises. Using a theoretical model, we show that a sudden increase in sovereign default risk may lead...

A bank's decision on loan supply and capital structure determines its immediate bankruptcy risk as well as the future availability of internal funds. These internal funds in turn determine a bank's future costs of external finance and future vulnerability to bankruptcy risks. We study these...

This paper examines the Leverage Ratio and Total Capital Ratio of global versus non-global banks in both the pre- and post-crisis periods. A panel data set of 165 global and non-global financial institutions from 38 countries is used for the period 1999-2015 and a random effects model is...

This paper investigates why micro-prudential regulations such as capital requirement fail to maintain the stability of a financial system. With a static model on financial institutions' risk-taking behavior, we quantify the impact on systemic risk in the cross-sectional dimension when imposing a...

This paper studies why the micro-prudential regulations fails to maintain a stable financial system by investigating the impact of micro-prudential regulation on the systemic risk in a cross-sectional dimension. We construct a static model for risk-taking behavior of financial institutions and...

Banking regulation routinely designates some assets as safe and thus does not require banks to hold any additional capital to protect against losses from these assets. A typical such safe asset is domestic government debt. There are numerous examples of banking regulation treating domestic...

In attempting to promote bank stability, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) provides a framework that seeks to control the amount of tail risk that large banks take in their trading books. However, banks around the world suffered sizeable trading losses during the recent crisis....