Extremely long odds accompany the chance that spurious-regression bias accounts for investor sentiment's observed role in stock-return anomalies. We replace investor sentiment with a simulated persistent series in regressions reported by Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2012), who find higher long-short...

Extremely long odds accompany the chance that spurious-regression bias accounts for investor sentiment's observed role in stock-return anomalies. We replace investor sentiment with a simulated persistent series in regressions reported by Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2012), who find higher long-short...

Extremely long odds accompany the chance that spurious-regression bias accounts for investor sentiment's observed role in stock-return anomalies. We replace investor sentiment with a simulated persistent series in regressions reported by Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2012), who find higher long-short...

Consistent with neoclassical models with investment lags, we find that a bottom-up measure of aggregate investment plans, namely, aggregate expected investment growth, negatively predicts future stock market returns. with an adjusted in-sample R2 of 18.5% and an out-of-sample R2 of 16.3% at the...

A bottom-up measure of aggregate investment plans, namely, aggregate expected investment growth (AEIG) can negatively predict market returns. At the one-year horizon, the adjusted in-sample R-square is 18.2% and the out-of-sample R-square is 14.4%. The return predictive power is robust after...

Consistent with neoclassical models with investment lags, we find that a bottom-up measure of aggregate investment plans, namely, aggregate expected investment growth, negatively predicts future stock market returns. with an adjusted in-sample R2 of 18.5% and an out-of-sample R2 of 16.3% at the...