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We study lobbying behavior by firms in a two-region economy, with either centralized or decentralized provision of … profit-enhancing local public goods. Firms compete either in the market, lobbying for public good provision once entered in a … market, or for the market, lobbying to gain access to it. When firms compete in the market, we show that lobbying is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319795
Governments do not have perfect information regarding the priorities and the needs of different groups in the economy. This lack of knowledge opens the door for different groups to lobby the government in order to receive the government's support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412469
We propose a theory of tax centralization and inter governmental grants in politico-economic equilibrium. The cost of taxation differs across levels of government because voters internalize general equilibrium effects at the central but not at the local level. This renders the degree of tax...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011523762
We propose a theory of tax centralization and inter governmental grants in politico-economic equilibrium. The cost of taxation differs across levels of government because voters internalize general equilibrium effects at the central but not at the local level. This renders the degree of tax...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011523838
According to the fiscal federalism literature sub-central budget constraints become softer when local governments are more dependent on revenues over which they have no discretion. As a consequence of higher "transfer dependency", sub-central governments can expect to be bailed out by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011561182
Using data on federal highway grants from the Department of Transportation's Federal Highway Administration, this paper investigates several questions regarding the political economy of highway funding. We investigate the period 1994 - 2008 and examine whether political alignment and political...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704667
We propose a theory of tax centralization in politico-economic equilibrium. Taxation has dynamic general equilibrium implications which are rationally internalized at the federal, but not at the regional level. The political support for taxation therefore differs across levels of government....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011810615
I formulate a political-economy model of a fiscal union where the threat of secession imposes a limit on fiscal redistribution between regions. I argue that the trade-off between implementing the region's preferred fiscal policy and benefiting from inter-regional risk sharing depends on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009772825
This paper empirically investigates the underlying determinants of expenditure decentralization, based on the predictions of a new political economy model of partial decentralization. The analysis is based on an agency model, in which two levels of government are involved in the provision of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354073
We propose a theory of tax centralization and inter governmental grants in politico-economic equilibrium. The cost of taxation differs across levels of government because voters internalize general equilibrium effects at the central but not at the local level. This renders the degree of tax...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012981295