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letters of credit, which during the capital controls period had to be backed by firms’ own cash collateral rather than the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014358873
letters of credit, which during the capital controls period had to be backed by firms’ own cash collateral rather than the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014256876
We use the German Crisis of 1931, a key event of the Great Depression, to study how depositors behave during a bank run in the absence of deposit insurance. We find that deposits decline by around 20 percent during the run and that there is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013161892
This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225568
This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226538
On 16th November 2009, SUERF, CEPS and the Belgian Financial Forum coorganized a conference "Crisis management at cross-roads" in Brussels. All papers in the present volume are based on contributions at the conference and the SUERF Annual Lecture which followed the event.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011706117
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011790739
Recent econometric evidence has noticeably changed views on the desirability and the appropriate design of explicit Deposit Insurance Schemes (DIS). The purpose of this paper is to take a second look at the data. After surveying recent empirical work and providing a theoretical framework, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440433
This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061062
I study the relation between shadow banking and financial stability in an economy in which banks are susceptible to self-fulfilling runs and in which government-backed deposit insurance is limited. Shadow banks issue only uninsured deposits while commercial banks issue both insured and uninsured...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012135982