Banks failed in 2008 because individuals with knowledge of risks were not connected to individuals who had the incentive and power to take corrective action. Evidence of this problem is provided by reports from the Lehman liquidator and The US Government Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission....

When agents anticipate that a future shock could start a crisis, they may take preemptive actions that contribute to the crisis. This can create panic — a crisis even when the fundamental does not warrant it. We construct an optimal dynamic information disclosure policy called “timely...

We propose a simple model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers in our model engage in self-deception to arrive at a belief that optimally trades off the anticipatory utility benefits and material costs of optimism. Lenders' contract design...

We propose a simple model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers in our model engage in self-deception to arrive at a belief that optimally trades off the anticipatory utility benefits and material costs of optimism. Lenders' contract design...

In recent years, U.S. government entities have become increasingly active as commercial participants in corporate restructurings by providing rescue loans when private market funding is unavailable. Like private lenders, the government can effectively control the operations of distressed...

Structured finance is often mentioned as the main cause of the latest financial crisis. We argue that structured finance per se did not trigger the last financial crisis. The crisis was propagated around the world because of poor risk management such as agency problems in the securitization...

It is well known that movements in lending rates are asymmetric; they rise quickly and sharply, but fall slowly and gradually. Not known is the fact that the asymmetry is stronger the less developed a country's financial system is. This new fact is here documented and explained in a model with an...

Do rating agencies increase or decrease financial market stability? This paper analyzes whether credit rating agencies may help to avoid inefficient self-fulfilling credit defaults. If investors follow risk-dominant strategies, we show that rating announcements and investors' private information...

This paper is concerned with the allegation that fair value accounting rules have contributed significantly to the recent financial crisis. It focuses on one particular channel for that contribution: the impact of fair value on actual or potential failure of banks. The paper compares four...

During the global financial crisis, a large number of banks worldwide either failed or received financial aid thus inflicting substantial losses on the system. We contribute to the early warning literature by constructing a dynamic competing risks hazard model that explores the joint...