Many commentators have argued that if the Federal Reserve had followed a stricter monetary policy earlier this decade when the housing bubble was forming, and if Congress had not deregulated banking but had imposed tighter financial standards, the housing boom and bust - and the subsequent...

Central banks repo market operations and liquidity infusions occasion a structural liquidity mismatch in bank balance sheets and increase the dependence on central bank liquidity. This paper argues for what I term “Circular Monetary Economics”, an approach to monetary policy that seeks to...

Intangible-intensive firms in the U.S. hold an enormous amount of liquid assets that are in fact short-term debts issued by financial intermediaries. This paper builds a macro-finance model that captures this structure. A self-perpetuating savings glut emerges in equilibrium. As intangibles...

This chapter puts forward a manual for how to setup and solve a continuous time model that allows to analyze endogenous (1) level and risk dynamics. The latter includes (2) tail risk and crisis probability as well as (3) the Volatility Paradox. Concepts such as (4) illiquidity and liquidity...

Global risk-off shocks can be highly destabilizing for financial markets and, absent an adequate policy response, may trigger severe recessions. Policy responses were more complex for developed economies with very low interest rates after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). We document, however,...

Global risk-off shocks can be highly destabilising for financial markets and, absent an adequate policy response, may trigger severe recessions. In Caballero and Kamber (2019), we document that the unconventional policies adopted by the main central banks were effective in containing asset price...

The subprime crisis produced bizarre movements in real and financial aggregates. In particular, the presence of an unusual relationship between quantitative easing policies and credit market conditions led to an unprecedented drop in the real economic activity. In a Brainard (1967)'s parameter...

We exploit the Eurosystem's longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) of 2011–2012 to assess whether a large provision of central bank liquidity to banks during a financial crisis has a positive impact on banks' credit supply to firms. We control for credit demand by examining firms that...

On 4 March 2011, SUERF – The European Money and Finance Forum and the National Bank of Poland jointly organised a conference on the theme of: "Monetary Policy after the Crisis". Following a call for papers with a large number of submissions, the scientific committee selected 9 papers, which...

Despite the fact that the Panic of 1825 was arguably Britain's most severe economic crisis of the first half of the nineteenth century, many of the subsequent explanations of its causes have been briefly-stated and incomplete. The goal of this paper is to clarify and deepen the credit expansion...