In this paper, we use the axioms introduced in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and Rogers and Veraart (2013) and study their consequences in terms of optimal sets of defaulting firms. We show that, from this point of view, the Absolute Priority axiom is not independent. We also show that the optimal...

We propose an explanation for default contagion based on a Lucas model with two independent debt-financed trees. The transmission mechanism is that variations in the size of one tree impact the level of risk premium and the default decision for all borrowers. If a negative shock hits one tree,...

This paper analyzes whether the financial distress of a firm affects the investment decisions of non-distressed competitors. On average, firms in distress impose indirect costs to non-distressed competitors by increasing costs of credit in the industry and hence restricting credit access and...

The Lehman bankruptcy highlights the potential for interconnectedness to cause negative externalities through counterparty contagion, but the externalities may also arise from information contagion. We examine contagion from troubled financial firms and find that counterparty contagion is...

The Lehman bankruptcy highlights the potential for interconnectedness among financial firms to cause a financial crisis. Previous research shows that Chapter 11 filings cause significant negative externalities, consistent with a strong role for counterparty contagion. However, the effects may...

When contemplating Chapter 11, firms often need to seek financing for their continuing operations in bankruptcy. Because such financing would otherwise be hard to find, the Bankruptcy Code authorizes debtors to offer sweeteners to debtor-in-possession (DIP) lenders. These inducements can be...