This written testimony accompanied Professor J.W. Verret's oral testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. This testimony outlines flaws in the Trust Agreement established by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to manage the government's $180 Billion investment in...

There are few things more constant in life than the rise and fall of financial markets. When markets crash, however, we are forced to restore them while learning from our mistakes. In the wake of the recent subprime mortgage crisis, Congress has drastically but deservedly overhauled the...

This synopsis contains excerpts from and novel introductions to the four chapters constituting “FairEconomy. Crises, Culture, Competition and the Role of Law”, a monograph co-authored and published by the late Wolfgang Fikentscher, Philipp Hacker and Rupprecht Podszun in 2013. In honor and...

Several commentators have argued that financial “reform” legislation enacted after a market crash is invariably flawed, results in “quack corporate governance” and “bubble laws,” and should be discouraged. This criticism has been specifically directed at both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act...

This paper analyzes the Wirecard AG case from a digital finance perspective. The relatively low pace of digital transformation of financial supervisors and the high speed of advancements in technology increase the technological gaps between supervisors and their responsibility areas and result...

The governance of infrastructure institutions in the financial markets – namely exchanges, central counter-parties (CCPs), and central securities depositories (CSDs) – has become a matter of significant commercial, regulatory, legislative, and even political concern. Such institutions play a...

We examine the political dynamics which led to the codification of the Principles and Standards for sound compensation practices at financial institutions at international (G 20) level and to their subsequent implementation on both sides of the Atlantic. We show that the regulation of bankers'...

The paper outlines the developments in the EU regulatory framework for executive remuneration since 2004 and going through the financial crisis. It also presents the results of an analysis of the remuneration practices adopted by the largest European listed firms before and after the crisis,...

This paper discusses why a “corporate governance movement” that commenced in the United States in the 1970s became an entrenched feature of American capitalism and describes how the chronology differed in a potentially crucial way for banks. The paper explains corporate governance's...