We analyze the term structure of illiquidity premiums as the difference between the yield curves of two major bond segments that are both government guaranteed but differ in their liquidity. We show that its characteristics strongly depend on the economic situation. In crisis times, illiquidity...

Both changing investors' behaviour and contingent events, such as financial crisis, stimulated a debate around the distribution of financial products for which an active market doesn't exist. Investing in illiquid financial instruments requires a certain degree of financial education in order to...

Using the introduction of Arrowhead low latency trading platform by Tokyo Stock Exchange as a natural experiment, I analyze the impact of high frequency trading on market quality of J-REITs, in terms of liquidity, volatility, and systemic risks. I also analyze the impact of the 2008 financial...

A liquidity measure based on consideration and price range is proposed. Initially defined for daily data, Liquidity Index (LIX) can also be estimated via intraday data by using a time scaling mechanism. The link between LIX and the liquidity measure based on weighted average bid-ask spread is...

Based on a detailed trade-level dataset, we analyze the proprietary trading behavior of German banks in the months directly preceding and following the Lehman collapse in September 2008. The default of Lehman Brothers was a shock to the German banking system that was both unexpected and...

Can ETFs trigger fire sales in illiquid assets? We develop and empirically examine a model where an authorized participant (AP) holds bond inventory and connects the ETF to the underlying bond market. For redemptions, the AP acts as a buffer between the two markets, holding redeemed bonds to...

US money market funds (MMFs) play an important role in short-term markets as large investors of Treasury bills (T-bills) and repurchase agreements (repos) with banks and the Federal Reserve, some of the world’s safest and most liquid assets. We build a theoretical model in which MMFs’...

Secondary markets for long-term assets might be illiquid due to adverse selection. In a model in which moral hazard is confined to project initiation, I find that: (1) when agents expect a liquidity dry-up on such markets, they optimally choose to self-insure through the hoarding of...