In the context of a two-state, two-trader financial market herd model introduced by Avery and Zemsky (1998) we investigate how informational ambiguity in conjunction with waves of optimism and pessimism affect investor behavior, social learning and price dynamics. Without ambiguity, neither...

We analyze a novel feedback mechanism between market and funding liquidity that causes self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups. Financial firms facing funding withdrawals have an incentive to acquire information about their assets. Those with good assets gain by resorting to outside liquidity sources...

I study how trading motives in asset markets affect equilibrium outcomes and welfare. I focus on two types of trading motives - informational and allocational. I show that while a fully separating equilibrium is the unique equilibrium when trading motives are known, multiple equilibria exist...

We study how dynamic research affects information acquisition in financial markets. In our strategic trading model, the trader performs costly research to generate private information but does not always succeed. Optimal research activity responds to market conditions and generates novel...

This paper studies (non-)equivalence of collateralized credit and asset sale for information-sensitive assets in over-the-counter markets. A signaling game refined by the undefeated equilibrium endogenizes the choice between pooling and separating offers and addresses the payment puzzle. The...

We study a noisy rational expectations equilibrium in a multi-asset economy populated by informed and uninformed investors and noise traders. The assets can include state contingent claims such as Arrow-Debreu securities, assets with only positive payoffs, options or other derivative securities....

During currency crises, large traders once simultaneously short the asset markets and currency market. We study the large trader's information manipulation in crises by introducing a large trader in an asset market and a currency-attack coordination game with imperfect information. The asset...

I study how trading motives in asset markets affect equilibrium outcomes and welfare. I focus on two types of trading motives -- informational and allocational. I show that while a fully separating equilibrium is the unique equilibrium when trading motives are known, multiple equilibria exist...

I study bargaining over prices between two investors in financial over-the-counter markets with asymmetric information. I focus on environments in which an asset owner has private information about both her liquidity state and asset quality, and so a buyer is uncertain about the owner's true...

Recently exchanges have been directly selling market data. We analyze how this practice affects price discovery, the cost of capital, return volatility, and market liquidity. We show that selling price data increases the cost of capital and volatility, worsens market efficiency and liquidity,...