aggregation for corporate risk-taking and investment. Market imperfections cause controlling shareholders to invest too much in … shareholders' collective attempts to boost shareholder value of individual firms leads to a novel pecuniary externality that … excess leverage, agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, negative welfare effects of transparency, excess …

aggregation for corporate risk-taking and investment. Market imperfections cause controlling shareholders to invest too much in … shareholders' collective attempts to boost shareholder value of individual firms leads to a novel pecuniary externality that … excess leverage, agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, negative welfare effects of transparency, excess …

Does managerial entrenchment create or destroy shareholder value? This Article presents both theory and evidence that … academics and market participants, is that entrenchment reduces accountability to shareholders and amplifies agency costs, thus …, these findings are consistent with the theory that there are significant costs, not just benefits, to exposing managers to …

model in which the shareholders portfolio selection of assets and the decisions of the publicly-traded firms are integrated … shareholders substantially influences firms behavior in the real sector. After characterizing the unique equilibrium, we show that … the financial sector integrates the preferences of all shareholders into the decisions for production and ownership …

model in which the shareholders portfolio selection of assets and the decisions of the publicly-traded firms are integrated … shareholders substantially influences firms behavior in the real sector. After characterizing the unique equilibrium, we show that … the financial sector integrates the preferences of all shareholders into the decisions for production and ownership …