I formulate a political-economy model of a fiscal union where the threat of secession imposes a limit on fiscal redistribution between regions. I argue that the trade-off between implementing the region's preferred fiscal policy and benefiting from inter-regional risk sharing depends on the...

We propose a theory of tax centralization in politico-economic equilibrium. Taxation has dynamic general equilibrium implications which are rationally internalized at the federal, but not at the regional level. The political support for taxation therefore differs across levels of government....

We propose a theory of tax centralization and intergovernmental grants in politico-economic equilibrium. The cost of taxation differs across levels of government because voters internalize general equilibrium effects at the central but not at the local level. The equilibrium degree of tax...

The distribution of public revenues is one of the fundamental elements in the shaping of the system of public finance in any country. The process is difficult from both the political and economic points of view. Also the objective conditions make the ideal distribution impossible and any...

This paper analyses and compares the efficiency of alternative incentive compatible grant schemes under asymmetric information relieving subnational governments of excessive debt burden. They allow intervention into local debt, local tax or complete local fiscal policy. In the fist case,...

In this study, we analyze the cyclicality of fiscal policies in China during the period 1978-2013. We find that the cyclicality of local government spending in China significantly affects the cyclicality of total government spending. By employing both time-series and province-level panel data,...

In this study, we analyze the cyclicality of fiscal policies in China during the period 1978-2013. We find that the cyclicality of local government spending in China significantly affects the cyclicality of total government spending. By employing both time-series and province-level panel data,...

Fiscal rules that constrain sub-central government (SCG) budgeting are very common across the OECD, but there are substantial cross-country differences in their implementation and impact. This paper presents the 2011 update of the fiscal rules database established in 2005. As in 2005, budget...

The implications of delegating fiscal decision making power to sub-national governments has become an area of significant interest over the past two decades, in the expectation that these reforms will lead to better and more efficient provision of public goods and services. The move towards...