In this paper we argue that two important causes of welfare losses in oligopolistic markets have been neglected. We show that in models where location is endogenous, welfare losses arising from wrong locations or from lack of market coverage may be substantial despite firms competing in prices....

Tax benefits to owner-occupied housing provide incentives for housing consumption, offsetting weaker disincentives of the property tax. These benefits also help counter the penalty federal taxes impose on households who work in productive high-wage areas, but reinforce incentives to consume...

Tax benefits to owner-occupied housing provide incentives for housing consumption, offsetting weaker disincentives of the property tax. These benefits also help counter the penalty federal taxes impose on households who work in productive high-wage areas, but reinforce incentives to consume...

We investigate the effects of restricting locations of firms into Hotelling duopoly models. In the standard location-price models, the equilibrium distance between firms is too large from the viewpoint of consumer welfare. Thus, restricting locations of firms and reducing the distance between...