We investigate corporate governance experts' claim that it is detrimental to a firm to reappoint former CEOs as directors after they step down as CEOs. We find that more successful and more powerful former CEOs are more likely to be reappointed to the board multiple times after they step down as...

This paper estimates the determinants of appointments of 'outsiders' -- directors previously employed by banks or other non-financial firms -- to the boards of large (non-financial) Japanese companies. Appointments of both types of 'outsiders' increase with poor stock performance; those of bank...

During the recent financial crisis, financial expertise among independent directors of financial institutions is negatively related to changes in both Tobin's Q and cumulative stock returns. Furthermore, financial expertise is positively associated with risk-taking levels in the run-up to the...

We examine how risk taking and firm value are related to independence and financial expertise of the board for a large sample of U.S. financial institutions both before and during the financial crisis. During the crisis, financial expertise is negatively related to both changes in Tobin's Q and...

During the recent financial crisis, financial expertise among independent directors of commercial banks is negatively related to changes in both firm value and cumulative stock returns. Furthermore, financial expertise is positively associated with risk-taking levels in the run-up to the crisis...