Economics has firms maximizing value and people maximizing utility, but firms are run by people. Agency theory concerns the mitigation of this internal contradiction in capitalism. Firms need charters, regulations and laws to restrain those entrusted with their governance, just as economies need...

Economic models routinely assume firms maximize shareholder wealth; however common law legal systems only require that officers and directors pursue the interests of the corporation, leaving this ill-defined. Economic arguments for shareholder wealth maximization derived from shareholders'...

Economic models routinely assume firms maximize shareholder wealth; however common law legal systems only require that officers and directors pursue the interests of the corporation, leaving this ill-defined. Economic arguments for shareholder wealth maximization derived from shareholders'...

Economic models routinely assume firms maximize shareholder wealth; however common law legal systems only require that officers and directors pursue the interests of the corporation, leaving this ill-defined. Economic arguments for shareholder wealth maximization derived from shareholders'...

We examine the value of multinationality to investors as reflected in firms' q ratios. The positive impact of research and development and advertising spending on a firm's q is enhanced by multinationality, but multinationality itself has no significant impact. This supports the internalization...

We investigate the relation between firms' ownership structures and q ratios in Japan. At low levels of ownership by main banks, firms' q ratios fall as bank equity ownership rises. At higher levels of bank ownership, this relationship is mitigated and, in some specifications, even reversed. We...