This paper studies the reputation effect in which a long-lived player faces a sequence of uninformed short …

I study how a firm manages its reputation by investing in the quality of its product and censoring bad news. Without …

We study a firm's incentives to build and maintain reputation for quality, when quality is persistent and can be … investment– depend only on the firm's reputation. MPE vary in frequency of certification and payoffs, but are generally …

a firm with a low reputation to reestablish itself. But, the ability to promote can crowd out incentives for investment … at high reputations; the firm allows its reputation to decay more before it is renewed relative to a firm motivated by …

We study a canonical model of reputation between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run opponents, in which the … long-run player is privately informed about an uncertain state that determines the monitoring structure in the reputation … sufficient conditions (on the monitoring structure and the type space) to obtain reputation building in this setting …

A patient seller faces a sequence of buyers and decides whether to build a reputation for supplying high quality … results provide an explanation to empirical findings of reputation failures in developing countries. I also discuss the …

To analyze strategic interactions arising in the cyber-security context, we develop a new reputation game model in …