The paper considers a model of a federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the capital by competing in capital income taxes and public investment that enhance the productivity of capital. The regions' choices determine the allocation of capital across the regions and their...

In this paper we explore how political pressures for an increased decentralisation of revenue and expenditure competencies to sub-national governments may affect the degree of interregional redistribution accomplished by the public sector. We do this by focusing on a specific case, that of the...

This paper questions the effectiveness of matching grants to correct for interjurisdictional spillovers in the light of Bernheim general neutrality result. Indeed this result suggests that the usual argument that matching grants are needed to internalize the externality arising from the...

The European economic integration leads to increasing mobility of factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transfer programs. This article investigates the possibility to achieve by means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocation of factors and the optimal level of...

European economic integration leads to increasing factor mobility, thereby threatening the stability of social transfer programs. This paper investigates the possibility of achieving, by means of voluntary matching grants, both the optimal allocation of factors and the optimal level of...

This paper explores the nexus between decarbonisation and intergovernmental fiscal relations, focusing on related challenges and reform options. It highlights the significant role of subnational governments in tackling climate change. Subnational and national governments share responsibilities...

Strategic interjurisdictional behavior and the interaction over time of the mean and dispersion of average tax rates across states are analyzed in a vector autoregression model. Variance decompositions reveal that fiscal competition explains roughly one-third of the time variation of state and...

We analyze a model of moral hazard in local public services which could be efficiently managed by officials under local democratic accountability, but not by officials who are appointed by the ruler of a centralized autocracy. The ruler might prefer to retain an official who diverted resources...

The paper reconsiders the theory of fiscal federalism in a framework inspired by property-rights theory. We set up a two-period model where on a first stage a region in a federation can expend value-enhancing investments into a public project. The project can be implemented on a second stage,...