This paper uses a simple model of fiscal competition between local jurisdictions to analyse the impact of intergovernmental grants on the composition of public spending. We find that a higher degree of redistribution within a system of ʺfiscal equalisationʺ coincides with a smaller overall...

This paper examines the determinants of sub-national governments risk premia using secondary market data for U.S., Canada, Australia and Germany. It finds that, as for central governments, fiscal fundamentals matter in the pricing of risk premia, and sub-national governments with higher public...

In diesem Beitrag werden einige finanzwissenschaftliche Anmerkungen zu den Vorteilen einer Länderfusion von Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein getroffen und in den Kontext der bestehenden Finanzverfassung gestellt. Eine Länderfusion von Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein verspricht unter anderem...

Recent literature has emphasized that redistributive grant systems may tend to internalize fiscal externalities arising from tax competition. This paper further explores the conditions under which local grant systems enforced by the state government will enhance efficiency. A system of...

Recent literature has emphasized that redistributive grant systems may tend to internalize fiscal externalities arising from tax competition. This paper further explores the conditions under which local grant systems enforced by the state government will enhance efficiency. A system of...

Recent literature has emphasized that redistributive grant systems may tend to internalize fiscal externalities arising from tax competition. This paper further explores the conditions under which local grant systems enforced by the state government will enhance efficiency. A system of...

We assess the fiscal behaviour in the European Union countries for the period 1990-2005 via the responsiveness of budget balances to several determinants. The results show that the existence of effective fiscal rules, the degree of public spending decentralization, and the electoral cycle can...