This paper presents the results from a series of framed field experiments conducted in fishing communities off the Caribbean coast of Colombia. The goal is to investigate the relative effectiveness of exogenous regulatory pressure and pro-social emotions in promoting cooperative behavior in a...

We show that grandfathering fishing rights to local users or recognizing first possessions is more dynamically efficient than auctions of such rights. It is often argued that auctions allocate rights to the highest-valued users and thereby maximize resource rents. We counter that rents are not...

In 2003, an industry-financed, government-administered buyback of trawl fishing permits and vessels took place on the US West Coast, resulting in the retirement of about one-third of the limited-entry trawl fleet. The lack of cost data in this fishery precludes an analysis of how the buyback has...

This paper uses a semi-parametric empirical model to estimate the economic benefitsof adopting a property rights-based management program in the Gulf of Mexico grouperfishery. The analysis predicts that a rights-based fleet will be comprised of fewer, morecost efficient boats than under the...

This paper studies equilibrium search and learning in a dynamic shing gamethat is played by independent shermen and by members of an information sharingCooperative. Once collected, information about the location of productive sh-ing sites is an excludable public good. We show that independent...