This paper analyzes efficient pricing at a congested airport dominated by a single firm. Unlike much of the previous literature, we combine a dynamic (bottleneck) model of congestion and a vertical structure model that explicitly considers the role of airlines and passengers. We show that when a...

We investigate the relationship between airline network structure and airport congestion. More specifically, we study the ways in which airlines adjust capacity to delays depending on the network type they operate. We find some evidence suggesting that airlines operating hub-and-spoke structures...

This study investigates airport congestion pricing and capacity investment with cost recovery consideration. Two countries’ airports are interlinked and served by each country’s home carrier. Our global welfare maximization shows that when per-passenger subsidies are not feasible under...

This paper analyzes slot-based approaches to management of airport congestion, using a model where airlines are asymmetric and internalize airport congestion. Under these circumstances, optimal congestion tolls differ across carriers, and since a slot-sale regime (with its uniform slot price)...

The goal of this paper is to bring some unity to the theoretical side of the debate on internalization of airport congestion by showing that all the literature's theoretical results can be derived within one simple and unified framework. The analysis starts by replicating the results of...

This paper studies the regulation of an airline duopoly on a congested airport. Regulation should then address two market failures: uninternalized congestion, and overpricing due to market power. We find that first-best charges are differentiated over airlines if asymmetric, and completely drive...