The primary aim of this study is to investigate the stock return volatility surrounding management earnings forecasts. Disclosure by managers of expected earnings are particularly important communications, and as such, it is important to understand the capital market implications surrounding...

This paper examines whether managers strategically time their earnings forecasts (MEFs) as litigation risk increases. We find as litigation risk increases, the propensity to release a delayed forecast until after the market is closed (AMC) or a Friday decreases but not proportionally more for...

We empirically examine the associations between the cost of capital and the timeliness of analysts' earnings forecasts, as a proxy for disclosure precision. We document that as the precision of the information increases so does the cost of capital, consistent with prior research showing more...

The purpose of a management earnings forecast is to forecast the eventual earnings figure released to the market at the earnings announcement date. To the extent that management earnings forecasts should reduce periodic shocks by reducing information asymmetry, stock return volatility is...