We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question....

There are two standard versions for one-shot oligopoly games: the Cournot game and the Bertrand game. The common feature is that in both games the strategic variables are supply curves. Under Cournot the supply curves are vertical lines in price-quantity space, under Bertrand they are horizontal...

We build a game-theoretic model to examine how better demand forecasting due to algorithms, machine learning and artificial intelligence affects the sustainability of collusion in an industry. We find that while better forecasting allows colluding firms to better tailor prices to demand...

So far, if one wished to analyse economic markets in all their complexity - i.e. by incorporating all information regarding firm and consumer behavior available from the fields of economics, marketing, consumer research, competitive strategy, and business analysis - she had to use formulas with...

We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question....

We identify all return leader-follower pairs among individual stocks using Granger causality regressions. Thus-identified leaders can reliably predict their followers' returns out of sample, and the return predictability works at the level of individual stocks rather than industries. Our results...