We estimate a Bayesian learning model with heterogeneity aimed at explaining expert forecast disagreement and its evolution over horizons. Disagreement is postulated to have three components due to differences in: i) the initial prior beliefs, ii) the weights attached on priors, and iii)...

We propose a new approach to deal with structural breaks in time series models. The key contribution is an alternative dynamic stochastic specification for the model parameters which describes potential breaks. After a break new parameter values are generated from a so-called baseline prior...

We propose a new approach to deal with structural breaks in time series models. The key contribution is an alternative dynamic stochastic specification for the model parameters which describes potential breaks. After a break new parameter values are generated from a so-called baseline prior...

We propose two novel methods to "bring ABMs to the data". First, we put forward a new Bayesian procedure to estimate the numerical values of ABM parameters that takes into account the time structure of simulated and observed time series. Second, we propose a method to forecast aggregate time...

We propose two novel methods to "bring ABMs to the data". First, we put forward a new Bayesian procedure to estimate the numerical values of ABM parameters that takes into account the time structure of simulated and observed time series. Second, we propose a method to forecast aggregate time...

Conventionally, game theory predicts that the joint mixed strategy of players in a noncooperative game will satisfy some equilibrium concept. Relative probabilities of the joint strategies satisfying the concept are unspecified, and all strategies not satisfying it are assigned probability zero....

We describe a methodology for making counterfactual predictions when the information held by strategic agents is a latent parameter. The analyst observes behavior which is rationalized by a Bayesian model in which agents maximize expected utility, given partial and differential information...

We describe a methodology for making counterfactual predictions when the information held by strategic agents is a latent parameter. The analyst observes behavior which is rationalized by a Bayesian model in which agents maximize expected utility given partial and differential information about...