We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question....

We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question....

I introduce a reduced form two-sided market model to study prediction and identification in two-sided markets. The model generates the hallmark features of two-sided markets: potentially below cost or even negative prices to one side of the market, and the “see-saw” or “waterbed” effect...

I introduce a reduced form two-sided market model to study prediction and identification in two-sided markets. The model generates the hallmark features of two-sided markets: potentially below cost or even negative prices to one side of the market, and the "see-saw" or "waterbed" effect of a...

There are two standard versions for one-shot oligopoly games: the Cournot game and the Bertrand game. The common feature is that in both games the strategic variables are supply curves. Under Cournot the supply curves are vertical lines in price-quantity space, under Bertrand they are horizontal...

So far, if one wished to analyse economic markets in all their complexity - i.e. by incorporating all information regarding firm and consumer behavior available from the fields of economics, marketing, consumer research, competitive strategy, and business analysis - she had to use formulas with...