This paper investigates the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance-pricing provisions) are more favorable and syndicated loans...

This paper provides direct evidence that managerial style is a key determinant of the firm's cost of capital, in the context of private debt contracting. Applying the novel empirical method by Abowd, Karmarz, and Margolis (1999) to a large sample that tracks job movement of top managers, we find...

It is the common understanding that private lenders evaluate and price the debt contract based on the credit rating, default risk and firm characteristics of the borrowing firms. This paper takes a different angel and investigates the extent to which the loan contract incorporates and reflects...

We investigate the impact of going-concern opinions on price and non-price terms of bank loans. We argue that the existence of going-concern opinions increases both the default risk ex post and the information risk ex ante. Therefore, upon the issuance of these opinions, banks impose more...