The corporate governance literature has shown that self-interested controlling owners tend to divert corporate resources for private benefits at the expense of other shareholders. Such behavior leads the controlling owners to prefer long maturity debt to short maturity debt, to avoid frequent...

We contribute to the literature on “market timing” by exploring periods of simultaneous equity issues and debt retirements (a leverage decreasing recapitalization, LDR). We hypothesize and show that such LDRs are driven by measures of creditor control but are not predicted by capital...

This research investigates the relationship between corporate block ownership and firm financial leverage. Corporate blockholders, which are nonfinancial firms who hold more than five percent equity in a target industrial firm, can affect the target firm's policies through their business...

The median U.S. non-regulated firm reports a 47 percent decline in leverage ratio between 1980 and 2010. We investigate whether the cost-benefit tradeoff to shareholders, captured by the valuation impact of an additional dollar of debt on owners' equity, is an explanation for the observed change...

We study a model in which leverage and compensation are both choice variables for the firm and borrowing spreads are endogenous. First, we analyze the correlation between leverage and variable compensation. We show that allowing for both endogenous compensation and leverage fully rationalizes...

Debt-type compensation (i.e., inside debt) exacerbates the divergence in risk preference between the CEO and shareholders that in turn affects the firm's capital structure decisions. An excessively risk-averse CEO uses debt that falls short of the shareholders' desired level, and is eager to...

We develop and test a model of debt structure and pricing in leveraged buyouts (LBOs). The model accounts for both market and firm specific variables and illustrates how collateral, security and seniority, as well as target future cash-flows and market interest rates determine the cost of...

We show that the structure and pricing of debt in LBOs mostly depend on a single characteristic of the target firm, pre-LBO profitability. We find a positive relationship between pre-LBO profitability and deal leverage, that is consistent with a dynamic trade-off theory of capital structure in...

This paper studies whether debt renegotiation mitigates debt overhang and improves investment efficiency. Using mergers between lenders participated in the same syndicated loans as natural experiments that exogenously reduce the number of lenders and thus make renegotiation easier, I find that...

Do leveraged buyout transactions increase the chance of bankruptcy? While corporate finance theory predicts that such sharp changes in capital structure increase financial distress costs by raising the probability of bankruptcy for each company, previous studies seem to fail to find any...