We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the standard prediction of the lemons market model–if any, only low-type firms are traded–is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the difference between pre- and post-merger...

This paper examines the determinants of mergers and bankruptcies, using firm level data from the Swiss Business Census and the Dun & Bradstreet exit database for Switzerland (1995-2000). Employing duration analysis, we find considerable differences in the determinants of mergers and...

We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the standard prediction of the lemons market model-if any, only low-type firms are traded-is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the difference between pre- and post-merger profits,...

This paper examines the determinants of mergers and bankruptcies, using firm level data from the Swiss Business Census and the Dun & Bradstreet exit database for Switzerland (1995-2000). Employing duration analysis, we find considerable differences in the determinants of mergers and...

We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the standard prediction of the lemons market model-if any, only low-type firms are traded-is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the difference between pre- and post-merger profits,...