Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 655
Cover Image
Chapter 15 Antitrust
Kaplow, Louis; Shapiro, Carl - In: Handbook of law and economics : volume 2, (pp. 1073-1225). 2007
policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023495
Cover Image
Do Mergers Result in Collusion?
Ganslandt, Mattias; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan - 2004
We examine coordinated effects of mergers in the Swedish retail market for gasoline during the period 1986-2002. Despite significant changes in market concentration and many factors conductive to coordination, the empirical analysis shows that the level of coordination is low. In addition,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320138
Cover Image
Sequential Product Design
Ecer, Sencer - 2006
price collusion or merger is expected and with multi-product monopoly. In models with no price competition, less specific …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779622
Cover Image
Tacit Collusion, Firm Asymmetries and Numbers : Evidence from EC Merger Cases
Davies, S. W.; Olczak, Matt - 2007
tacit collusion is most likely. We construct a database relating to 62 candidate mergers and find that, in the eyes of the … Commission, tacit collusion in this context virtually never involves more than two firms and requires close symmetry in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051119
Cover Image
The Coordinated Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Markets
Kuhn, Kai-Uwe - 2005
The paper addresses the issue of coordinated effects of mergers in the framework of a differentiated products model. Firms' assets are product varieties that can be sold individually or entirely transferred to another firm in a merger. We show that under symmetric optimal punishment schemes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068549
Cover Image
The Merger Paradox, Collusion and Competition Policy
Garcia, Filomena; Paz y Miño, Jose Manuel; Torrens, Gustavo - 2020
This paper develops a model that formalizes several connections between mergers, collusion and competition policy. In … equilibrium, firms may merge to make collusion sustainable when it cannot be sustained with the original set of firms. A rise in … the probability of detecting and prosecuting collusion could induce a wave of mergers, so firms can sustain collusion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014110460
Cover Image
Mergers : Coordinated Effects
Greene Morales, Elisa; Klein, Timo - 2023
Mergers between competitors (i.e. horizontal mergers) come with two key theories of harm: unilateral effects and coordinated effects. In this paper, we review the appropriate economic framework for assessing coordinated effects in the context of a merger review. We focus on the three necessary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014258320
Cover Image
Profitable horizontal mergers without cost advantages: The role of internal organization, information, and market structure
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - 2001
Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, me rger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare – improving even if costs are linear. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307515
Cover Image
Horizontal mergers, involuntary unemployment, and welfare
Budzinski, Oliver; Budzinski, Jürgen-Peter - 2009
Standard welfare analysis of horizontal mergers usually refers to two effects: the anticompetitive market power effect reduces welfare by enabling firms to charge prices above marginal costs, whereas the procompetitive efficiency effect increases welfare by reducing the costs of production...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321682
Cover Image
Implications of unprofitable horizontal mergers: A positive external effect does not suffice to clear a merger!
Budzinski, Oliver; Kretschmer, Jürgen-Peter - 2009
We demonstrate that the popular Farrell-Shapiro-framework (FSF) for the analysis of mergers in oligopolies relies regarding its policy conclusions sensitively on the assumption that rational agents will only propose privately profitable mergers. If this assumption held, a positive external...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321686