This paper analyzes the CEO incentives of inside debt in the form of deferred equity compensation in the context of M&A decisions. This study runs statistical regressions on the likelihood of a merger, whether the deal is diversifying, how much stock is used to pay for the deal, and the relative...

We provide evidence concerning the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions and outcomes for different types of mergers: vertical, horizontal, and diversifying. Using chief executive officer (CEO) relative inside leverage to proxy for the incentives...

We analyze the incentives of CEO inside debt in the form of pensions and deferred compensation in the context of merger and acquisition decisions. CEO inside debt holdings are negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm engaging in merger or acquisition activity. When firms with...

The increasing challenge of how to balance “soft” human factors with “hard” financial factors in mergers and acquisitions (M & A) to be successful is not new. However, the real challenge lies in the question of how, and with which yardstick, to measure and compare the human factor in...

This paper explores some consequences for economic efficiency of creative accounting practices by merging companies. It assumes semi-strong information efficiency in the markets for capital and for corporate control; and/or the use of executive contracts relating pay to accounting profit.Ahead...

Mergers & Acquisitions sind ein haeufiges Phaenomen in der heutigen Wirtschaftswelt, mit hohen Misserfolgsraten von ca. 50 bis 70 Prozent. Falsches oder mangelndes Management personeller Faktoren ist haeufig dafuer verantwortlich. Im vorliegenden Buch wird das Human Resource Management in der...

I study a protectionist anti-takeover law introduced in 2014 that covers a subset of all firms in the economy. The law decreased affected firms' likelihood of becoming the target of a merger or acquisition and had a negative impact on shareholder value. There is no evidence that management of...

Using a sample of US bank mergers from 1995 to 2012, we observe that the pre-post merger changes in CEO bonus are significantly negatively related to the strength of corporate governance within the bidding bank. This suggests that bonus compensation is not consistent with the “optimal...

Do merger bonuses to target CEOs facilitate a wealth transfer from target to acquirer shareholders? We test this hypothesis against an alternative that bonuses enable a useful contractual revision in compensation contracts when takeovers generate small synergies. When target CEOs get a merger...

Our paper examines two critical members in the top management “subteam” – CEO and CFO – in firms' merger and acquisition (M&A) decision. We propose a concept of CEO-CFO relative optimism, measured by CEO's optimism relative to CFO's pessimism, to capture the subteam's collective...