conditional probability of eliciting an antitrust challenge (i.e.,remedies and prohibitions) involves the strongest deterrence …We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect tothe composition and frequency of …-losses: deterrence variables akin to the traditional conditional probabilities from theeconomics of crime literature. We find the …

We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our … empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as – unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 … deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0 …

, Competition Policy Indexes, or CPIs. The CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a competition policy in a jurisdiction, where … for competition policy we mean the antitrust legislation, including the merger control provisions, and its enforcement …

the antitrust discourse. The current competition and antitrust policy topics that are addressed include the as …-efficient-competitor-test in abuse control, the regulation of systemic market power in digital ecosystems, antitrust interventions based on …

the antitrust discourse. The current competition and antitrust policy topics that are addressed include the as …-efficient-competitor-test in abuse control, the regulation of systemic market power in digital ecosystems, antitrust interventions based on …

, Competition Policy Indexes, or CPIs. The CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a competition policy in a jurisdiction, where … for competition policy we mean the antitrust legislation, including the merger control provisions, and its enforcement …