Der vorliegende Beitrag wendet die dynamische Wettbewerbstheorie von Wolfgang Kerber und anderen auf aktuelle Fragen der Wettbewerbspolitik an. Damit zeigt der Beitrag, dass dynamische Wettbewerbstheorien sehr wohl zu konkreten wettbewerbspolitischen Empfehlungen führen und einen wichtigen...

Der vorliegende Beitrag wendet die dynamische Wettbewerbstheorie von Wolfgang Kerber und anderen auf aktuelle Fragen der Wettbewerbspolitik an. Damit zeigt der Beitrag, dass dynamische Wettbewerbstheorien sehr wohl zu konkreten wettbewerbspolitischen Empfehlungen führen und einen wichtigen...

This chapter aims to review data-driven mergers including, but not limited to, major conglomerates involving large scale of individual user data, known as ‘big data', by Facebook (WhatsApp), Microsoft (Yahoo!, Skype and LinkedIn), Google (Double Click), TomTom (Tele Atlas), Publicis/Omnicon,...

Should internet era merger policy differ from industrial era merger policy? Platform ecosystems rely on economies of scale, data-driven economies of scope, high-quality algorithmic systems, and strong network effects that frequently promote winner-take-most markets. Their market dominance has...

The ministerial proposal for a 10th amendment of the German competition law particularly addresses abuse control and seeks to tighten this pillar of competition policy against the background of the challenges from the digital economy. Next to extending the classic policy instruments of abuse...

In this paper, we comment on the debate about guidelines for Art. 102 TFEU in the face of the challenges brought by digital ecosystems and abuse of dominance in related markets. We take the perspective of dynamic competition economics and derive four recommendations for the future enforcement of...

Antitrust populists increasingly call on the government to “break up big tech.” But antitrust enforcers would face heavy evidentiary burdens if they sought to break a company up on the premise that a long-consummated merger was unlawful from the outset and should have been blocked years ago....

We analyze horizontal mergers when the acquirer holds a passive partial ownership stake (PPO) in the target firm prior to the merger. We show that a PPO reduces the minimal synergy level necessary to make a merger beneficial for consumers. It follows that an antitrust authority ignoring existing...

There have been a number of studies attempting to quantify the impact of cartels and mergers on prices. The state of the art of empirical analysis related to antitrust is best illustrated by the research of John Connor and John Kwoka. Connor summarizes the existing empirical research that...

The analysis of unilateral effects in horizontal mergers — especially on markets for differentiated goods — can take into consideration the extent to which the merging firms are close competitors. The elimination of a close competitor can result in an upward pricing pressure (UPP) on the...