The paper considers an extension of the original Shapley and Shubik (1972) two-sided matching problem to the case of multisided matching with transfereable utility. We investigate existence and properties of stable matchings using the approach of cooperative game theory.

This paper examines the implementation of various solutions in differentiable concave production economies with one privately owned input, one output, and publicly owned production technology. The public ownership solutions we focus on are the Proportional Solution (PS) and the Equal Benefit...

This paper examines the implementation of two public ownership solutions in convex production economies with differentiable production functions. The two public ownership solutions we focus on are the proportional and equal benefit solutions. Two "natural" mechanisms which doubly implement the...

We study endogenous coalition formation in contexts where individual (and group) payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure that might form. We capture potential interaction across coalitions by means of a partition function.

This paper describes the historical evolution of the analysis of some aspects of the strategic use of information. The use of mixed strategies aims to create uncertainty on the move to be played or on the private information of the players. In a repeated game framework, strategic behavior when...

A hostage with respect to an action of a player is defined here to be an amount ofpayoff that will be placed in the opponent's possession if the player takes the action. Whereas the only Nash equilibrium for a prisoner's dilemma game is mutual defection, it is shown that there are at most two...

This paper examines the implementation of two public ownership solutions in convex production economies with differentiable production functions. The two public ownership solutions we focus on are the proportional and equal benefit solutions. Two "natural" mechanisms which doubly implement the...

This paper examines the implementation of various solutions in differentiable concave production economies with one privately owned input, one output, and publicly owned production technology. The public ownership solutions we focus on are the Proportional Solution (PS) and the Equal Benefit...

This paper studies a population of agents, each of whom can be either an Altruist or an Egoist. Altruists confer benefits on others at a cost to themselves. Altruism is thus a strictly dominated strategy and cannot survive if agents are rational best-responders. We assume that agents choose...