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We consider zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility and propose a simple non-cooperative game to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared. First, the players bid for the right to propose a sharing of the surplus. Second, after the winner pays the bids, she...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783630
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783635
A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk-takers and the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-take-all game determines the males' right to reproduce, and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783642
The main result of the paper is that policy reversals are more likely floowing realization of extreme and relatively unlikely values of parameters that map policy choice into outcomes. A corollary to this result is that policy reversals occur infrequently.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783665
If we express our knowledge in sentences, we will find that these sentences to some extent are linked by logical rules. We ask whether the structure logic imposes on our knowledge restricts what we forget and what we remember. The model is a two period S5-style modal logic. In this logic we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005675340
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This paper proposes a procedurally rational solution concept for two-person extensive-form games with complete information. The solution concept is based on the observation that the ex-post justifiability of choices is often a primary concern for decision-makers, especially in organizations. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005675397
In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This models a steady state of a learning process in which players observe actions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005675416
We explore sequential voting in symmetric two-option environments. We show that the (informative) symmetric equilibria of the simultaneous voting game are also equilibria in any sequential voting structure. In unanimity games, (essentially) the whole set of equilibria is the same in all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647214
We extend Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) structure theorem concerning the Nash equilibrium correspondence to show that its graph is not only homomorphic to the underlying space of games but that it is also unknotted. This is then shown to have some basic consequences for dynamics whose rest points...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647215