We introduce a spatial cost topology in the network formation model analyzed by Jackson and Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory 71 (1996), 44-74. This cost topology might represent geographical, social, or individual differences. It describes variable costs of establishing social network...

This paper generalizes the results of Suijs, De Waegenaere and Borm (1998) to arbitrary risks. It provides Pareto optimal allocations and shows that the zero utility premium calculation principle yields a core-allocation.

This paper analyzes linear production situations with price uncertainty, and shows that the corresponding stochastic linear production games are totally balanced. It also shows that investment funds, where investors pool their individual capital for joint investments in financial assets, fit...

This paper considers an investment timing problem in a dipole framework. The results of the seminal contribution by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985, RES) are extended by introduction of uncertainty. Three scenarios are identified. In the first scenario we have a preemption equilibrium with dispersed...

The class of neighbour games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (cf. Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component additive games (cf. Curiel et al. (1994)). For assignment games and component additive games there exist polynomially bounded algorithms or order p4 for...

The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) for TU-games is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of weight systems as in Kalai and Samet (1987, 1988). This weighted constrained egalitarian solution is based on the weighted Lorenz-criterion as an inequality measure. It...

In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payoofs change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by...

This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in a situation where coalitions impose externalities on other players. It is shown that an agreement will be reached without delay provided that any set of coalitions profit from merging.