I apply three noncooperative models of coalition formation to a Cournot olygopoly. In each model, each firm has to choose the coalition it wants to belong to. But each of those models is characterised by a different assumption that defines what happens to a coalition from which one or more...

In this work, a new axiomatization of the Shapley value is presented. An associated game is constructed which can also be interpreted as a perturbation of the original game. We define a sequence of games, when the term of order n, in this sequence, is the associated game of the term of order (n-1).

In the context of capital accumulation games this paper proposes two concepts that describe the interactions between agents and give a counterpart, in a symmetric infinite horizon framework, of the well known Fudenberg and Tirole's Taxinomy concerning investment strategies in two-stage games.

This paper presents two new axiomatizations of the Owen value for games with coalition structures. Other axiomatizations can be found in the literature: Owen (1977), Hart and Kurz (1983), and Winter (1992). The driving force of my axiomatization is a consistency axiom based on an associated...

The aim of this paper is to present a new value of a cooperative game for the case of limited communication between players. The communication system we consider may be represented by a simple graph, that is, only pairwise meetings can occur and some of them are not permitted. An associated game...

The aim of this note is about the formalization of the problem of open- access natural resourses by the prisonner's dilemma game. The extreme simplification of the metaphor between prisonner's dilemma and the "tragedy of the commons" leads to imagine only two strategies...

This paper considers a model of oligopolistic competition and locational choice that incorporates the notion of regional industrial systems. Firms play a non cooperative game where the strategy set of firms is given by a set of existing industrial districts. Each firm is distinguished by its...