This is a preliminary version of a prospective book which springs from concerted effort among several researchers in the fiels of industrial economics. This chapter is devoted to the strategic role of information in oligopoly, and more broadlyn, in monotone games in general.

This paper investigates the endogenous choice between price- and quantity-setting behaviour in a duopoly game where firms invest in product development first, and then play a marketing game later. Only in the initial R&D stage, the two firms set up a joint venture in order to share the costs of...

Tax compliance is modelled as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a costly state verification game with imperfect auditing. Neither the tax payer nor the auditor can measure the tax payer's true liability precisely: they observe independent noisy signals.

In a parimutuel betting system, a successful player's return depends on the number of players who choose the same action. This paper examines a general solution for two-action sequential parimutuel games, and shows how the (unique) equilibrium of such games leads to a simple pattern of...

The paper considers an extension of the original Shapley and Shubik (1972) two-sided matching problem to the case of multisided matching with transfereable utility. We investigate existence and properties of stable matchings using the approach of cooperative game theory.

This paper shows the possibility that, under certain conditions, it can be socially optimal for the public firm not to privatise its whole production capacity but to retain a part of it, even when private operation of the production facilities is strictly more cost-efficient than public operation.

This is a preliminary version of a chapter of a prospective book which springs from concerted effort among several researchers in the field of industrial economics. This chapter is devoted to recent development in research on strategic investment. We start with a brief overview on the past...

In an oligopoly supergame, firms' actions in prices and quantities are subject to non-negativity constraints. These constraints can obstruct the practicability of optimal punishment (a la Abreu (1986), Lambson (1987), and Hackner (1996)) in sustaining tacit collusion. Noting that the prospect of...

It has been shown that if buyers have zero search cost and the remainder a common positive search cost, and sellers post prices, then there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium-sellers choose a price distribution. We show that increasing the number of search cost types results in another...