It is well known that, whereas in one-agent contexts the value of information is always positive, in strategic situations, this is not always the case. We will consider the class of games for which, under a specific information structure, there exists a unique Pareto payoff profile, and we show...

The paper discusses several topics such Nash equilibria, repeated games. It also discusses applications to market games, regulation and R&D games.

We characterize the max min of repeated zero-sum games in which player one plays in pure strategies sonditional on the private observation of a fixed sequence random variables. Meanwhile we introduce a definition of a strategic distance between probability measures, and relate it to the standard...

We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria.

This paper describes the historical evolution of the analysis of some aspects of the strategic use of information. The use of mixed strategies aims to create uncertainty on the move to be played or on the private information of the players. In a repeated game framework, strategic behavior when...

If the allocation of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state - contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed...

The paper studies a behavioral learning process where an agent plays, at each period, an action with a probability which is proportional to the cumulative utility he got in the past with that action. The so-called CPR learning rule and the dynamic process it induces are formally stated and...

A general procedure inspired by the Shapley value is proposed for decompodsing any inequality index by factor components or by populations subgroups. To do so we define two types of inequality games. Although these games cannot be expressed in terms of unanimity games, an axiomatization of the...