The payoffs of a symmetric 2x2 coordination game are perturbed by agent-specific heterogeneity. Individuals observe a (possibly sampled) history of play, which forms the initial hypothesis for an opponent's behaviour. Seedings beliefs in this manner, they iteratively reason toward a Bayesian...

This paper takes a new look at the classic concession game. It argues that exit from an asymmetric war of attrition is likely to be instant. Selecting a unique equilibrium using a "craziness" pertubation device, it finds a notion of stochastic strength determines the outcome, with a...

In a game where the players have non-additive beliefs, we explore the beliefs implicit in the equilibrium behaviour of the players. Under one interpretation, we can show that there are well-defined departures from common knowledge of the game among the players. Our argument revolves around a...

This paper explains the observed stagnation of 'Happiness' measures in the post-war period through a growth model in which agents care about conspicuous consumption.