Economic theory predicts that it is impossible to have cooperation in finitely repeated games such as a prisoner's dilemma game without communication. In an experiment on a voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good that is a version of a Hawk-Dove game, we obderved that...

Succeeding Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995) and Saijo, Tatamitani and Yamato (1995), we define several conditions of natural mechanisms in production economies, and proposed two types of natural mechanisms, that is, the quantity and price-quantity types.

This paper examines the implementation of various solutions in differentiable concave production economies with one privately owned input, one output, and publicly owned production technology. The public ownership solutions we focus on are the Proportional Solution (PS) and the Equal Benefit...

Economic theory predicts that it is impossible to have cooperation in finitely repeated games such as a prisoner's dilemma game without communication. In an experiment on a voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good that is a version of a Hawk-Dove game, we obderved that...

In this paper, we shall provide a theoretical overview of what are the chief implications of fucusing institutions and economic systems, what are the main sources of their evolution, how are their evolutionary paths affected by various economic factors. In the latter half, we shall provide a...

Succeeding Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995) and Saijo, Tatamitani and Yamato (1997), we define two types of natural mechanisms quantity and price-quantity types, in convex production economies, and characterize the class of Pareto subsolutions doubly implementable in Nash and strong Nash equilibria...

This paper discusses and develops "non-welfaristic" arguments on distributive justice, mainly basing upon J. Rawls and A.K. Sen, and formalizes, in cooperative production economies, "non-welfaristic" distribution rules as game forms. First, it conceptualizes Needs Principle that the distribution...

This paper examines the implementation of two public ownership solutions in convex production economies with differentiable production functions. The two public ownership solutions we focus on are the proportional and equal benefit solutions. Two "natural" mechanisms which doubly implement the...

This paper examines the implementation of two public ownership solutions in convex production economies with differentiable production functions. The two public ownership solutions we focus on are the proportional and equal benefit solutions. Two "natural" mechanisms which doubly implement the...

This paper examines the implementation of various solutions in differentiable concave production economies with one privately owned input, one output, and publicly owned production technology. The public ownership solutions we focus on are the Proportional Solution (PS) and the Equal Benefit...