We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionary literature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simple behavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.

In this article, we study the emergence of coordination in repeated Sender-Receiver games with common interests when the messages have no common meaning before the game starts. We define axiomatic interpretation rules of the histories and study the resulting language-free signaling equilibria...

This paper formalizes the relation between comparative statics and the out-of-equilibrium explanation for how a system evolves after a change in parameters.

I study an evolutionary model of equilibrium selection in supermodular games where players are involved in simultaneous play. This is taken to refer to a context, in contrast with most evolutionary literature, where players' objective is to have their actions match a certain statistic of the...

We apply the stochastic evolutionary approach of equilibrium selection to macroeconomic models in which a complementarity at the macro level is present. These models often exhibit multile Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria , and the best response-correspondence of an individual increases with a...

This paper makes two points. First, the modeling used in the rational (or Bayesian) learning literature can be generalized to handle the repeated shocks to preferences inherent and implicit in models of quantal response equilibria (QRE). In particular, we note that the Bayesian model and the QRE...

In sender-receiver games high-quality types can distinguish themselves from low-quality types by sending a costly signal. Allowing for additional, noisy information on sender types can radically alter sender behavior in such games. We examine equilibria where medium types separate themselves...

This paper derives sufficient conditions for a class of games of complete information , such as first price auctions, to have pure trategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). The paper treats games between two or more heterogeneous agents, each with private information about his own type (for example, a...